Casari, Marco ;
Zhang, Jingjing ;
Jackson, Christine
(2011)
When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 53.
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4478.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(763).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Abstract
It is still an open question when groups will perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to group learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement within a group, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.
Abstract
It is still an open question when groups will perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over the minority opinion and to group learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement within a group, what prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation.
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
winner's curse, takeover game, group decision making, communication, experiments
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:36
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:36
URI
Other metadata
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
winner's curse, takeover game, group decision making, communication, experiments
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:36
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:36
URI
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