Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior

Andergassen, Rainer (2009) Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 14. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4609. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (638). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm’s stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders’ trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Andergassen, Rainer
Parole chiave
executive compensation, fraud, incentives, product market competition
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4609
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2016 13:53
Ultima modifica
15 Feb 2016 13:53
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4609

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