Andergassen, Rainer
(2009)
Product Market Competition, Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 14.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4609.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(638).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm’s stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders’ trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.
Abstract