A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games

Bagnoli, Lidia ; Negroni, Giorgio (2008) A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 8. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4623. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (627). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper proposes an interpretation of the experimental evidence on tacit coordination games involving randomly matched players provided by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), based on the notion of stochastic stability. When the model is calibrated with the parameters chosen in the experiment, it predicts that every strict Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable; therefore, in the long run we should not observe the emergence of any particular pattern of behavior, as suggested by the experimental evidence. The model is also compatible with the experimental evidence provided by Goeree and Holt (2005).

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bagnoli, Lidia
Negroni, Giorgio
Parole chiave
coordination games, stochastic stability
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
16 Feb 2016 15:09
Ultima modifica
16 Feb 2016 15:09
URI

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