Lanzi, Diego
(2005)
Screening Efficiency of Networks.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 8.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4734.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(555).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
In this paper, we study screening efficiency of networks as organizations in comparison with polyarchies and hierarchies. Firstly, we briefly characterize these organizational architectures, then we rank them in the case of infinitely many and finitely many decisional units. As we show and discuss, networks are more efficient than polyarchies and hierarchical architectures with good initial choice portfolios. In opposition, whether Type II errors are very likely to occur, a hierarchy preforms better than polyarchies and networks. Finally, we illustrate how these organizations perform when a budget constraint has to be fulfilled.
Abstract