A Chicken Game of Intraindustry Trade

Colombo, Luca ; Labrecciosa, Paola ; Lambertini, Luca (2005) A Chicken Game of Intraindustry Trade. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 15. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4741. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (548). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study the strategic interaction between two firms competing in quantites which decide whether exporting into each other market. The product is homogeneous and production entails constant returns to scale. Scope effects are present. By dealing with two types of trade costs, namely per unit and ad valorem trade costs, we characterize the set of Nash equilibria showing that one way trade is a possible outcome of the trade game. In particular, despite the assumption on symmetry between firms, unilateral trade arises provided trade costs are sufficiently high. The private incentives towards one way trade are then compared with the social ones.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Colombo, Luca
Labrecciosa, Paola
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
intra-industry trade, unilateral trade, trade costs, economies of scope
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
01 Apr 2016 09:31
Ultima modifica
01 Apr 2016 09:32
URI

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