Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly Supergame with Nash Punishments

Baldelli, Serena ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly Supergame with Nash Punishments. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4782. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (510). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria obtains; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price-quantity supergames.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Baldelli, Serena
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
repeated games, collusion, product differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4782
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 15:23
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 15:23
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4782

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