Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2003) Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 8. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4818. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (476). ISSN 2282-6483.

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Abstract

A vertically integrated monopoly is compared to a decentralized market arrangement where production is segmented. A Labor Managed firm produces an input used by a profit maximizer manufacturer of a final good. Unlike what usually occurs between homogenoeus firms we find circumstances in which the decentralised vertical arrangement is privately superior to the integrated one.

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