Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2003) Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 8. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4818. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (476). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

A vertically integrated monopoly is compared to a decentralized market arrangement where production is segmented. A Labor Managed firm produces an input used by a profit maximizer manufacturer of a final good. Unlike what usually occurs between homogenoeus firms we find circumstances in which the decentralised vertical arrangement is privately superior to the integrated one.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Parole chiave
Vertical Integration Labor Managed Firms
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/02 Politica economica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4818
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 11:40
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 11:40
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4818

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