Rossini, Gianpaolo
(2003)
Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 8.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4818.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(476).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
A vertically integrated monopoly is compared to a decentralized market arrangement where production is segmented. A Labor Managed firm produces an input used by a profit maximizer manufacturer of a final good. Unlike what usually occurs between homogenoeus firms we find circumstances in which the decentralised vertical arrangement is privately superior to the integrated one.
Abstract