Lambertini, Luca
(2002)
Stackelberg Leadership in a Dynamic Duopoly with Capital Accumulation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 14.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4856.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(442).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically à la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, as in Solow’s (1956) growth model.The leader invests more than the followersò as a result, in steady state the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower`s Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat`s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.
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