Non-Linear Market Demand and Capital Accumulation in A Differential Oligopoly Game

Lambertini, Luca ; Cellini, Roberto (2000) Non-Linear Market Demand and Capital Accumulation in A Differential Oligopoly Game. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 20. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4937. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (372). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate a differential oligopoly game where firms compete in account Market whose demand function is always downward sloping but can take any degree of curvature. There exist two economically meaningful saddle points, one dictated by demand conditions, the other by the Ramsey rule. In steady state, optimal capital is non-decreasing in market size. Then we show that the socially efficient output is independent of the curvature of market demand. This entails that the welfare loss associated to the Cournot equilibrium decreases as market size increases.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Parole chiave
Cournot competition, curvature of Market demand, capital accumulation, differential games, steady state
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Apr 2016 10:03
Ultima modifica
09 Giu 2016 09:41
URI

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