Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
(1996)
Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 28.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(286).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
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