Lambertini, Luca
(1996)
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 23.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5051.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(259).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Preview |
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (151kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The issue of a cartel stability is investigated in a vertical differentiation framework with convex variable production costs. The behaviour of firms' critical discount factors as the curvature of the cost function varies is analysed, considering either the noncooperative or cooperative qualities, and either price or quantity behaviour. It emerges that, if firms aim at stabilizing the cartel, they are better off paying à la Counot and prefer not to choose the monopoly qualities.
Abstract
Other metadata
Downloads
Downloads
Staff only:
