Lambertini, Luca
(1994)
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 8.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5115.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(211).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude.
Abstract