Delegation and Product Differentiation

Lambertini, Luca (1993) Delegation and Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5184. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (173). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
10 Giu 2016 09:27
Ultima modifica
10 Giu 2016 09:27
URI

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