Lambertini, Luca
(1993)
Delegation and Product Differentiation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5184.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(173).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Preview |
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (60kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
Abstract
Other metadata
Downloads
Downloads
Staff only:
