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Lambertini, Luca
(1993)
Delegation and Product Differentiation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5184.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(173).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
Abstract
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