Indivisibilities in R & D Investment and Transient Leadership in Oligopoly

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo (1988) Indivisibilities in R & D Investment and Transient Leadership in Oligopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5362. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (52). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 52.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (152kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. The R&D technology displays increasing returns in the form of invisibilities. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and we prove that the incumbent has never greater probability of winning the patent race than the rival.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
19 Lug 2016 13:38
Ultima modifica
19 Lug 2016 13:38
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^