Benassi, Corrado ; Antonello E., Scorcu
(2003)
Indexation Rules, Risk Aversion, and Imperfect Information.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/640.
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Abstract
Nominal wage adjustment is modeled as resulting from bargaining between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker, in an environment where the rate of inflation is a random variable. Risk aversion makes for endogenous indexation arrangements, which deliver partial indexation as they exploit imperfect inflation indices; risk aversion also generates a positive correlation between indexation and inflation variance. The model suggests a distinction between complete vs incomplete inflation adjustment on the one hand, and perfect vs imperfect adjustment on the other hand.
Abstract