Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation

Tavoni, Alessandro ; Winkler, Ralph (2020) Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/6510. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1154). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In the wake of 25 UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting), international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact that the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, the Paris Agreement, have had on curbing emissions demonstrate both the difficulties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article reviews, and draws lessons from, a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and international climate policy.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Tavoni, AlessandroUniversità di Bologna0000-0002-2057-5720
Winkler, RalphUniversity of Bern0000-0002-8473-847X
Parole chiave
international climate cooperation, hierarchical policy-making, domestic pressure, special interest groups, (strategic) delegation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
30 Ott 2020 10:12
Ultima modifica
30 Ott 2020 10:12
URI

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