RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability

Lambertini, Luca ; Poddar, Sougata ; Sasaki, Dan (1998) RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/767.
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Abstract

We characterise the interplay between firms' decision in product development undertaken through a research joing venture (RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. Participant firms in an RJV face a trade-off between saving the costs of product inno-vation by developing similar products to one another, e.g. by sharing most of the basic components of their products, and investing higher initial efforts in product innovation in order to develop more distinct products. We prove that the more the firms' products are distinct and thus less substitutable, the easier their collusion is to sustain in the marketing supergame, either in prices (Bertrand) or in quantities (Cournot). This gives rise to a non-monotone and discontinuous relationship between firms' product portfolio and their intertemporal preferences.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Poddar, Sougata
Sasaki, Dan
Parole chiave
R&D supergame collusion optimal punishment critical discount factor
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:04
URI

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