Exit, Sunk Costs and the Selection of Firms

Richelle, Yves ; Garella, Paolo G. (1995) Exit, Sunk Costs and the Selection of Firms. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/803.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 214.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (269kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

The paper analyzes the question of which cost characteristics are exhibited by the firms that exit an oligopolistic market when costs are asymmetric and firms can credibly be forced out by the remaining competitors. The main results are: (i) if reentry is impossible (due to the presence of large sunk costs), then the firm with the highest marginal cost function dtays in; if reentry is costless then the firm with the highest average cost exits. Consequenty sunk costs not only affect the number of firms in an industry, but they also enter the determination of the type of firms that resist predation.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Richelle, Yves
Garella, Paolo G.
Parole chiave
endogenous coalition formation exit sunk costs
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:05
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^