Ecchia, Giulio ;
Montinari, Natalia ;
Orsini, Raimondello ;
Vitellozzi, Sveva
(2025)
Breaking Stereotypes: How Valuing Workers’ Preferences Improves Task Allocation and Performance.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche,
p. 39.
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/8338.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(1202).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
Abstract
Firm performance depends critically on the efficient allocation of tasks across employees. Yet, task assignment decisions are often shaped not only by productivity considerations but also by managerial biases and gender stereotypes—frequently resulting in women being disproportionately assigned low-promotability, female stereotyped tasks. This paper investigates whether making workers’ task preferences visible to managers can reduce gender-stereotypical assignments and improve overall outcomes. We conduct two complementary experiments. In the first, participants act as workers, completing real-effort tasks and reporting their task preferences. In the second, a separate group of participants from the same subject pool takes on the role of managers and assigns tasks to pairs of workers under varying information conditions. In the control condition—where managers lack access to workers' preferences—task assignments are more likely to reflect gender stereotypes. In contrast, when managers are informed of workers’ preferences, stereotypical assignments decrease, and managerial earnings improve. We also find that preference-informed task allocation leads to higher managerial earnings, suggesting that reducing gender bias not only promotes fairness but also enhances organizational efficiency. Our findings highlight the potential of low-cost informational interventions to promote fairer and more effective task allocation practices.
Abstract
Firm performance depends critically on the efficient allocation of tasks across employees. Yet, task assignment decisions are often shaped not only by productivity considerations but also by managerial biases and gender stereotypes—frequently resulting in women being disproportionately assigned low-promotability, female stereotyped tasks. This paper investigates whether making workers’ task preferences visible to managers can reduce gender-stereotypical assignments and improve overall outcomes. We conduct two complementary experiments. In the first, participants act as workers, completing real-effort tasks and reporting their task preferences. In the second, a separate group of participants from the same subject pool takes on the role of managers and assigns tasks to pairs of workers under varying information conditions. In the control condition—where managers lack access to workers' preferences—task assignments are more likely to reflect gender stereotypes. In contrast, when managers are informed of workers’ preferences, stereotypical assignments decrease, and managerial earnings improve. We also find that preference-informed task allocation leads to higher managerial earnings, suggesting that reducing gender bias not only promotes fairness but also enhances organizational efficiency. Our findings highlight the potential of low-cost informational interventions to promote fairer and more effective task allocation practices.
Tipologia del documento
Monografia
(Working paper)
Autori
Parole chiave
Gender stereotypes, task allocation, managerial decision-making, labor market discrimination, experimental economics
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
07 Mag 2025 08:51
Ultima modifica
07 Mag 2025 09:47
URI
Altri metadati
Tipologia del documento
Monografia
(Working paper)
Autori
Parole chiave
Gender stereotypes, task allocation, managerial decision-making, labor market discrimination, experimental economics
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
07 Mag 2025 08:51
Ultima modifica
07 Mag 2025 09:47
URI
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