Nudges and bounded rationality. Choice architecture and the understanding of decision-making processes / Nudge e razionalità limitata. Architettura delle scelte e comprensione dei processi decisionali

Barbini, Francesco Maria (2025) Nudges and bounded rationality. Choice architecture and the understanding of decision-making processes / Nudge e razionalità limitata. Architettura delle scelte e comprensione dei processi decisionali. Bologna: TAO Digital Library, p. 102. ISBN 978-88-98626-38-0. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/8390. In: TAO Digital Library ISSN 2282-1023.
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Abstract

This ebook provides a detailed examination of Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge theory and evaluates its consistency with the theory of bounded rationality proposed by Herbert Simon. It first describes the theoretical pillars of nudge theory and discusses the main constructs, such as choice architecture, heuristics and biases, and libertarian paternalism. Then, it identifies points of potential complementarity with Simon’s theory. Through a comparative analysis of core concepts, it reveals that, beyond nominal alignment and terminological similarities, numerous methodological discrepancies render the two theories fundamentally divergent. The profound differences between Simon’s and Thaler and Sunstein’s perspectives are attributed to an underlying epistemological incompatibility. Finally, and somewhat unexpectedly, this essay uncovers salient epistemological links between nudge theory and classical functionalism.

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