Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2004) Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1578.
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Abstract

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or outsource in an uncertain framework. We consider two di¤erent market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two di¤erent vertical relationships: a Stackelberg one and a bargaining one. In the …rst scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If the bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Keywords
Vertical integration, uncertainty, stackelberg, bargaining
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
16 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:33
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