Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation

Lambertini, Luca (2001) Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 14. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4905. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (396). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

I analyse a differential game where firms, through capital accumulation over time, supply vertically differentiated goods. This proves that several results obtained by the static approach are not robust. I show that (i) the sustainability of the duopoly regime is conditional upon the level of firms’ R&D investments; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm invests more than the high quality firm; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm’s profits are larger than the high quality firm’s.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential game, capital accumulation, R&D, product quality
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Apr 2016 11:15
Last modified
01 Apr 2016 11:15
URI

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