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Lambertini, Luca
(2001)
Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 14.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4905.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(396).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
I analyse a differential game where firms, through capital accumulation over time, supply vertically differentiated goods. This proves that several results obtained by the static approach are not robust. I show that (i) the sustainability of the duopoly regime is conditional upon the level of firms’ R&D investments; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm invests more than the high quality firm; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm’s profits are larger than the high quality firm’s.
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