Market Power, Resource Extraction and Pollution: Some Paradoxes and a Unified View

Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George (2011) Market Power, Resource Extraction and Pollution: Some Paradoxes and a Unified View. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 25. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4440. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (798). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where firms' output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full-fledged model in which (i) the resource is explicitly considered as an input of production and (ii) the natural resource and pollution interact via the respective state equations. This allows us to show that the relationship between the welfare properties of the economic system and the intensity of competition is sensitive to the degree of accuracy with which the model is constructed.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Parole chiave
environmental externality, resource extraction, oligopoly, Pigouvian taxation, R&D
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
25 Gen 2016 15:45
Ultima modifica
25 Gen 2016 15:45
URI

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