Login per gli autori
Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro
(2011)
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4491.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(749).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
Anteprima |
Documento PDF
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (315kB) | Anteprima |
Abstract
We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.
Abstract
Altri metadati
Statistica sui download
Statistica sui download
Gestione del documento:
