Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro
(2011)
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4491.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(749).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.
Abstract