On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation

Lambertini, Luca (2010) On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4549. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (692). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

I characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. I show that the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. Then, I analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and compare the result generated by the dynamic setup with the merger incentive associated with the static model. It appears that allowing for the role of time makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the static setting.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
capacity, differential game, feedback equilibrium, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, horizontal mergers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
04 Feb 2016 11:37
Ultima modifica
04 Feb 2016 11:37
URI

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