Denicolò, Vincenzo
(1996)
No-Envy Arrow's Conditions.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 12.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5066.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(243).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
Anteprima |
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (124kB) | Anteprima |
Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between the theory of distributive justice based on the concept of envy-freeness and Arrovian social choise theory. We define two conditions of No-envy and study their relationship with Arrow' scondition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a weakening of this condition called Personal States Independence and the condition of Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the power to veto (in a limited sense) at least one alternative (presumably, one alternative which is particularly unfair to him).
Abstract