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Lambertini, Luca
(1994)
Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 11.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5121.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(205).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
Extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini (1993), we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations.
Abstract
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